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PRECONCEPTIONAL TORT LIABILITY-
RENSLOW V. MENNONITE HOSPITAL
The infant who is forced to live out its life bearing the burden of
infirmities caused by the tortious conduct of another presents a com-
pelling problem. Thus, over the years, prenatal tort liability 1 has
been the subject of much judicial consideration. While the early
common law afforded no recovery for an infant who was injured while
in the mother's womb, 2 the more contemporary approach has been to
permit actions for fetal injuries sustained during any point of in-
trauterine development. 3 Changes in social policy and advancements
in medical knowledge have also contributed to the .view that the fetus
should be recognized as a distinct legal personality entitled to the
protection of law. 4
The area of preconceptional tort liability 5 involves a different as-
pect of the prenatal tort liability problem. In this type of negligence
action, the plaintiff is not in existence at the time of the wrongful
conduct. In order to recognize a right of recovery for such a plaintiff,
courts have been forced not only to consider the social implications
and medical justifications, but also to reconsider the function and de-
velopment of the traditional elements of negligence. Recovery for
preconceptional tort liability has met with approval in only a handful
of jurisdictions. 6 Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court in
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital 7 permitted an infant to sue for pre-
natal injuries caused by tortious conduct that occurred before the
child's conception.
The plaintiff, Leah Ann Renslow, alleged in a six-count complaint
for negligence and willful and wanton misconduct" that in October of
1. For purposes of this Note, prenatal tort liability will refer to a cause of action seeking
recovery for the mental anguish and expenditures resulting from physical and mental defor-
mities sustained before the infant's birth. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975).
2. See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text infra.
4. See note 14 and accompanying text infra.
5. Preconceptional tort liability, for purposes of this Note, will refer to an action seeking
damages for prenatal injuries occasioned by wrongful conduct occurring prior to the infant's
conception,
6. See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
7. 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Renslow].
8. On January 22, 1975, a complaint was filed by Emma Renslow on her own behalf and on
behalf of her minor daughter, Leah Ann, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained as a
result of the alleged misconduct of the defendants. Counts I to V of the complaint involved the
allegations of Emma Renslow on her own behalf and were not before the appellate or supreme
court on appeal. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
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1965, the defendants, Mennonite Hospital and Dr. Hans Stroink,
wrongfully transfused Rh-positive blood into a thirteen year old girl,
Emma Renslow. Emma Renslow's Rh-negative blood was incompati-
ble with and sensitized by the Rh-positive blood. This fact was not
discovered until 1973 when, pregnant with Leah Ann, Emma Rens-
low was subjected to routine blood testing. Subsequent medical
diagnosis determined that the unborn child's life was endangered;
thus, labor was induced resulting in the premature live birth of Leah
Ann. It was further alleged that as a consequence of the preconcep-
tional sensitization of her mother's blood, the plaintiff suffered in-
juries including permanent damage to her nervous system and brain. 9
After briefly considering the history of prenatal and preconceptional
tort liability, this Note will discuss and analyze the three most sig-
nificant issues debated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow.
First, should the stage of fetal development at which the prenatal
injuries attach determine liability? Second, should the concept of
foreseeability of injuries to the plaintiff play a large role in imposing a
legal duty in a case of first impression? Finally, must there be a per-
son in existence before a duty of care may be owed? In conclusion,
9. Emma Renslow was admitted to the defendant hospital where the defendant doctor
headed the laboratory division. In the course of her treatment at the hospital, on Oct. 8 and
again Oct. 9, 1965, Emma was given two transfusions of 500 c.c. each of whole blood. The
medical diagnosis in 1973 determined that the sensitization of the mother's blood had caused
prenatal damage to the unborn child's hemolytic processes which put her life in jeopardy and
necessitated her induced premature birth. The plaintiff was born on March 25, 1974, jaundiced
and suffering from hyperbilirubemia. She required an immediate, complete exchange transfu-
sion of her blood which was followed by another shortly thereafter. The plaintiff suffered from
permanent damage to various organs, her brain and nervous system. Renslow v. Mennonite
Hosp., 40 Ill. App.3d 234, 235, 351 N.E.2d 870, 871 (4th Dist. 1976).
Based upon perceived common law principles of negligence, the trial court dismissed the
counts seeking damages for prenatal injuries because the plaintiff was not.conceived at the time
of the alleged infliction of injury. Although the trial court's reason for dismissing counts VI to X
of the complaint was that the person for whom those counts sought relief was not conceived at
the time of the alleged infliction of injury, the trial court's order apparently means that the
injury was sustained by the mother prior to the child's conception. As the appellate court cor-
rectly pointed out, "[t]he child herself could not possibly have suffered personal injuries prior
to the time she was conceived." id. at 237, 351 N.E.2d at 872.
The Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and found the com-
plaint sufficient to state a cause of action. 40 I11. App.3d at 234, 351 N.E.2d at 870. The
appellate court found no reason to dismiss the action simply because the plaintiff had not yet
been conceived when the tortious conduct took place. Id. at 240, 351 N.E.2d at 874. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Moran, affirmed the decision of the
appellate court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceeding. Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 67 1ll.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). Justice Ryan dissented, charging that
the majority's decision conflicts with fundamental principles of common law negligence. Justice
Dooley wrote a concurring opinion which responded in large part to Justice Ryan's argument
and took issue, to a certain degree, with the majority's use of foreseeability in establishing a
legal duty.
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this Note will examine the future impact of the Renslow decision
upon such areas as liability for radiation and chemical accidents,
"wrongful life" actions, and prenatally injured stillborn fetuses.
THE NATURE OF PRENATAL
AND PRECONCEPTIONAL TORT LIABILITY
The first American case to confront the question of the legal status
of the fetus on the subject of prenatal injuries due to tortious conduct
was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton,'0 a Massachusetts Su-
preme Court decision. In Dietrich, Justice Holmes held that an un-
born child could not be viewed as having a separate, independent
existence apart from the mother sufficient to sustain a cause of action
on the infant's own behalf." This position was generally followed by
American courts 12 until some sixty years later when a federal district
10. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884). In Dietrich, a woman, five months pregnant, was
negligently injured on a highway resulting in the premature live birth of her child who died
fifteen minutes later. The infant was denied a right of recovery for its prenatal injuries.
11. Although Dietrich was brought as a wrongful death action, Justice Holmes indicated that
since there existed no precedent for allowing the action, the infant could not have maintained
the action even had he survived. Id. at 15, 52 Am. Rep. at 243. But see Note, The Impact of
Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 558 n.25
(1962) which cites other authorities who have criticized Justice Holmes' lack of precedent argu-
ment.
Walker v. Great Northern R.R. Co., 28 L.R.Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891), which is usually cited along
with Dietrich, contains a clearer articulation of the reasons for denying an action for prenatal
injuries. In Walker, the complaint alleged that a child in utero sustained prenatal injuries while
the mother was a passenger on the defendant's train and was born malformed as a result. In
denying relief, the court asserted that absent privity between the railroad company and the
injured child, no independent duty could be owed to the plaintiff. In addition, the court em-
phasized the insurmountable problems in proving the causal relation between the prenatal in-
jury and the subsequent apparent damage: "There are instances in the law where rules of right
are founded upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof." Id. at 81.
Problems of proving the causal relation have loomed large as a reason for denying relief in
prenatal injury cases even where, as in Dietrich, the problem of establishing the causal connec-
tion is minimal. See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
The early common law had recognized only a few cases in which an unborn child had a
separate, independent existence apart from its mother. See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197
Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951), in which a Maryland appellate court noted that a child in its
mother's womb was regarded under common law principles as a legal personality from the time
of conception for purposes of taking an estate or to claim damages in admiralty. Further, the
common law recognized the crime of murder if a live-born child should later die as a conse-
quence of an assault while in utero. See Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for
Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 61, 66 n.24 (1960) for a comprehensive cataloguing of
these common law cases.
12. For a comprehensive listing of the Dietrich line of cases, see Del Tufo, Recovery for
Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RUrcERtS L. REV. 61, 62 n.6 (1960). Based on
the Dietrich foundation, later courts denying relief generally have done so for the following
reasons: (1) that there was a lack of precedent and stare decisis; (2) that while in the mother's
womb, a child has no independent existence apart from its mother; (3) that since the child is
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court overturned the Dietrich precedent.13 This later decision rec-
ognized a right of recovery for prenatal personal injuries sustained by
an unborn infant after it had reached the viability stage of in-
trauterine development. This rather abrupt reversal of the general
stance denying direct recovery can be viewed as a judicial recognition
of the advancement of medical knowledge concerning congenital mal-
formations. 14 Today, the majority of jurisdictions allow recovery for
infants negligently injured during the prenatal stage of viability. 15  In
addition, some courts, contemporaneous with the expansion of medi-
cal science, have discarded the criterion of viability and have allowed
recovery for injuries sustained ever closer to the moment of concep-
tion. 16
part of the mother, the wrong will be remedied when the mother sues and recovers for her
injuries; (4) that proof of causation would, at best, be difficult and overly speculative; and (5)
that the creation of new rights is the province of the legislature and not the judiciary. See note
77 and accompanying text infra.
13. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). The Bonbrest court recognized a
right of action in a child injured as a result of professional malpractice during its removal from
the mother's womb. Importantly, the factual situation was significantly different from that in
Dietrich. In Bonbrest, the injury was related directly to a viable fetus while in Dietrich, the
injury was transmitted through the mother before the fetus had attained viability. Recognizing
the difficulty of remoteness in the latter situation, the Bonbrest court distinguished Dietrich on
its factual difference and held that the child could not be denied recovery simply because it was
a "part" of its mother. Justice McGuire, writing for the majority, asserted: "True, it is in the
womb, but it is capable now of extrauterine life-and while dependent for its continued de-
velopment on sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a 'part' of
the mother in the sense of a constituent element .... ." Id. at 140. For further discussion of
Bonbrest, see Comment, Negligence and the Unborn Child: A Time for Change, 18 S.D. L.
REV. 204, 209 (1973).
14. The Bonbrest court's recognition of the advancement of medical science since Dietrich
served to dispel the fears of difficulty of proof. Indeed, the Dietrich court itself suggested that if
the difficulties of proof could be overcome, "a man might owe a civil duty and incur a condi-
tional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northhampton, 138 Mass. at 16, 52 Am. Rep. at 54.
15. For a comprehensive listing of those jurisdictions and cases allowing this type of recov-
ery, see Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 579, 585 nn.36, 37, 38 (1965).
16. The criterion of fetal viability has endured increasing attacks from the courts. See
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) (child born after
sustaining tortious injury at any point after conception has a right of action for such injuries);
Daley v. Meier, 37 I11. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1st Dist. 1961) (recovery allowed for
previable injuries medically provable as resulting from the negligence of the defendant); Ben-
nett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) (cause of action for previable injuries,
recognized on basis that that difficulty of proof should not bar recovery for a wrong if the
elements of a tort are present); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (child who
was in his mother's womb and was injured in an automobile collision caused by the defendant's
negligence was entitled to recover though previable at the time of the injury because of medical
science's recognition that the fetus is a distinct entity); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d
93 (1960) (recovery allowed for previable injuries since the fetus is regarded as having separate
existence from the moment of conception). For a criticism of the viability theory, see Comment,
A New Theory in Prenatal Injuries: The Biological Approach, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 684, 687-88
(1957-58).
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The emerging trend to allow recovery for injuries sustained up to
the moment of conception is the result of two fundamental premises.
First, there is a growing judicial recognition of the incongruity of im-
posing or denying liability on the basis of a medically indeterminable
moment of intrauterine development.1 7  Second, it is inherently un-
just to deny a cause of action where a child is physically or mentally
deformed for life as a result of prenatal injuries caused by the tortious
misconduct of another. 8 These considerations compel the recogni-
tion of a right of action for prenatal injuries occasioned by tortious
conduct occurring prior to conception.' 9
THE RENSLOW DECISION
In Illinois, the development of prenatal tort liability has paralleled
the growth in other jurisdictions. 20 However, as a result of Renslow,
17. See note 16 supra.
18. See note 19 infra.
19. Apparently, only three cases since the Dietrich decision of 1884 have recognized a cause
of action for a preconceptional tort. Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887), was the
first case to recognize preconceptional tort liability, allowing recovery by certain heirs who were
injured by the defendant who fraudulently induced the heirs' mother into marriage in order to
gain the heirs' estate. The court found no basis for denying recovery when the then uncon-
ceived plaintiffs were foreseeable in that they were the very objects whose injuries were being
contemplated by the defendant at the time of his wrongful conduct. Id. at 79, 13 N.E. at 630.
In a later case, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973), a
federal court of appeals allowed recovery for prenatal injuries sustained as a result of the wrong-
ful conduct of a drug manufacturer occurring before the conception of the plaintiff. In that case,
it was alleged that the birth control pills used by the mother and manufactured by the defen-
dant altered the chromosomal structure of the mother's body to produce mongoloid deformities
in her children. Also, in Park v. Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), the court allowed an action
by an infant where the defendant doctors failed to warn the mother, a previous victim of
rubella, of the risks to fetuses during subsequent pregnancies.
20. In Illinois, the development of prenatal tort liability has paralleled the growth in other
jurisdictions. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 II1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting)
by virtue of its strong dissent, became the springboard for later critical analysis of the doctrine
barring recovery. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Amann v. Faidy, 415
Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). Justice Boggs in his dissent in Allaire found Holmes' notion in
Dietrich that the unborn child is part of the "bowels" of its mother illogical when applied to an
infant who is viable and capable of living independent of its mother. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
For a thorough discussion of the Allaire decision, see Arnold, Prenatal Injuries: A Treatment
and Prognosis of the Law, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 442 (1969). Allaire was reaffirmed in Smith
v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1st Dist. 1939) wherein the court refused to
take action on the ground that legislative reform was the only instrument of change in that area.
However, in 1953, the Illinois Supreme Court changed the law existing since 1900 to conform
with Justice Bogg's dissent in Allaire. Amann v. Faidy, 415 11. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953)
(overruling Allaire) and a companion case, Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 I11. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721
(1953). In Daley v. Meier, 33 111. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1st Dist. 1961), the court
recognized an action to recover for prenatal injuries medically provable as resulting from the
negligence of another even if it had not reached the state of a viable fetus at the time of the
injury. For further discussion of the erosion of the viability requirement in Illinois, see note 35
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Illinois courts now have extended prenatal tort liability to acts occur-
ring prior to conception. In Renslow, the plaintiff brought an action
under the theory of prenatal tort liability which is grounded upon
common law negligence. 2 ' Essentially, the concept of negligence
mandates that all persons owe to others a duty to exercise due care to
guard against injury which may naturally flow as a reasonably proba-
ble and foreseeable consequence of their conduct. 22  The legal for-
mula for negligence requires the existence of a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proxi-
mately resulting from that breach. 23 In the area of prenatal tort lia-
bility in Illinois, prior to Renslow, however, there was an additional
requirement that the infant be viable at the time of the alleged in-
jury. 24
The Criterion of Fetal Viability
Viability,2 5 as a criterion for affording recovery for prenatal injuries
occurring during intrauterine development, was first proposed in I1-
and accompanying text infra. Dicta in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 I11. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849
(1st Dist. 1963), recognized the growing trend of allowing actions for injuries sustained closer to
the moment of conception.
21. In Renslow, the plaintiff argued against the necessity of establishing fetal viability as a
condition precedent to recovery. 67 Ill.2d at 352, 367 N.E.2d at 1253. See notes 22-24 and
accompanying text infra for discussion of negligence elements in Illinois. The plaintiff further
contended that a legal duty was owed because the medical likelihood of a child's being born
with neurological infirmities was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. Brief
and Argument of Appellees at 17-20, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d
1250 (1977). Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's failure to exercise due care in the
transfusion of the mother's blood directly produced the injuries for which recovery was sought.
67 Ill.2d at 350, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
22. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 903 (1959); Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill.2d 240, 302 N.E.2d 257 (1973); Lorang
v. Heinz, 108 Ill. App.2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 785 (2d Dist. 1969); Garrett v. S.N. Nielson Co., 49
Ill. App.2d 422, 200 N.E.2d 81 (1st Dist. 1964).
23. Lasko v. Meier, 394 111. 71, 67 N.E.2d 162 (1946); Fugate v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12
I11. App.3d 656, 299 N.E.2d 108 (1st Dist. 1973); Apato v. BeMac Transport Co., 7 I11. App.3d
1099, 288 N.E.2d 683 (1st Dist. 1972). The element of proximate cause requires a showing that
the injury was a natural and probable consequence of the negligent act. The growing trend is to
discard the concept of foreseeability in the determination of the proximate cause issue. See 1
DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 903 (1977).
24. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496,
114 N.E.2d 721 (1953).
25. Viability is the time at which a child is capable of being delivered and remaining alive
separate from and independent of the mother. Viability normally occurs 26-28 weeks after the
fetus' conception. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Il1.2d 368, 374, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1973);
See generally Discussion of Recent Decisions, Damages for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus-
Proof of Fetal Viability, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 227, 240 (1974) for a discussion of the medical
considerations relevant to proving fetal viability.
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linois by Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital. 26 The
Allaire case held that there was no right of recovery for injuries to
the plaintiff while in the mother's womb. Implicitly recognizing the
common law "principle" that the plaintiff must have had a distinct
and independent existence when the alleged injuries were inflicted, 2 7
Justice Boggs disagreed with the majority's assertion that a legal right
begins only at birth.2 8  He suggested instead that a legal right ac-
crues when the fetus is capable of independent and separate life.
2 9
Responding in part to the inherent presumption that the law must
keep pace with the sciences, 30 Illinois courts followed Justice Boggs'
theory and conferred a right of recovery upon infants who were viable
when prenatally injured. 31  Couched in terms of the common law
"principle" requiring that the plaintiff be "in esse" or in existence
when injured, 32 many other jurisdictions have extended recovery for
injuries to previable infants, 3 3 thus, conforming to what medical sci-
ence has long known-that a child is in existence from the moment
of conception. 34  Yet, prior to Renslow, the Illinois Supreme Court
26. 184 I11. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
27. For a critical analysis of the historical validity of this purported principle, see note 76
and accompanying text infra.
28. The majority in Allaire contended that the common law had not allowed an infant to
maintain an action for injuries sustained before its birth. 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640. Justice
Boggs rejected the majority's argument that prior to its birth an infant has no existence apart
from its mother. He apparently directed his argument toward Blackstone's proposition that in
contemplation of the common law, "[l]ife begins . . . as soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb." Id. at 371, 56 N.E. at 641.
29. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641. Justice Boggs stated:
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a period of
gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is capable of independent
and separate life, and that though within the body of the mother it is not merely a
part of her body, for her body may die in all of its parts and the child remain alive
and capable of maintaining life, when separated from the dead body of the mother.
If at that period a child so advanced is injured in its limbs or members, and is born
into the living world suffering from the effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing
truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but
wholly to the mother?
Id.
30. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946).
31. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
32. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 777 (1961).
33. A previable fetus is one which is incapable of surviving in the external world if separated
from its mother.
34. The effort by a small minority of courts to extend legal protection to an infant from the
moment of its conception has taken two approaches: (1) the biological-separability approach; and
(2) the causation approach. "Biological separability" was defined by the court in Puhl v. Mil-
waukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959):
Under this theory an unborn infant is not treated as a legal person but as a separate
entity or human being in the biological sense from conception having a potentiality
of personality which is not realized until birth. Injuries suffered before birth impose
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had not decided whether a surviving child has a cause of action for
prenatal injuries sustained in a previable stage of development.3 5
Responding to the plaintiff's complaint in Renslow, the defendants
relied on Amann v. Faidy 36 to contend that the plaintiff had failed to
state a cause of action for prenatal tort liability because there was no
allegation that the plaintiff was viable when injured. 37  Amann had
predicated prenatal tort liability upon the proposition that only "per-
sons" could be injured, and the fetus would attain that status only
when viable. 38  Nevertheless, the Renslow court held in favor of the
plaintiff, discarding the requirement of fetal viability. 39 Justice
Moran, speaking for the majority, pointed out that viability was an in-
herently unsatisfactory requirement because it was a point in time
incapable of exact measurement.40 He further supported the court's
position by emphasizing the harshness of denying claims for injuries
to the previable fetus when "substantial medical authority [dictates]
that congenital structural defects caused by the prenatal environment
can be sustained only early in the previable stages." 41 By rejecting
a conditional liability on the tort-feasor. This liability becomes unconditional, or
complete, upon the birth of the injured separate entity as a legal person. If such
personality is not achieved, there would be no liability because of no damage to a
legal person.
Id. at 356, 99 N.W.2d at 170. See also Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696
(1953) where it was held: "We ought to be safe in this respect by saying that legal separability
should begin where there is biological separability." Id. at 543, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
The causation approach focuses upon the establishment of the causal relation between the
infant's injury and the defendant's wrongful conduct and avoids consideration of the legal status
of the fetus. See Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 64 A.2d 93 (1960) which upheld the complaint
of a child injured in the first month of its gestation. The Sinkler court stated: "[t]he question is
primarily one of causation, and since medical proof of that is necessary, we now remove the
bars from it in limine." Id. at 274, 164 A.2d at 96. See also Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. 227 (1924)
for a discussion of this approach. For a discussion of the usage of this approach in the area of
preconceptional tort liability, see notes 69-71 and accompanying text infra.
35. Some appellate courts have answered this question in the affirmative. See Sana v.
Brown, 35 II1. App.2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1st Dist. 1962) (extending the right of action to a
surviving infant injured during the previable stage); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App.2d 218, 178
N.E.2d 691 (1st Dist. 1961) (rejecting the viability standard).
36. 415 Il. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
37. Brief and Argument of Appellant at 5, Renslow v. Mer~nonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
38. Brief and Argument of Appellant at 6. While the defendants correctly pointed out that
Amann was based upon the proposition that only "persons" can be injured, they erroneously
suggested that according to Amann the fetus becomes a person subject to injury "if the injury
occurs during gestation and if the child is born alive." The more accurate interpretation of
Amann is that the fetus must have attained viability at the time of injury in addition to a
live-birth. See Discussion of Recent Decisions, Damages for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus-
Proof of Fetal Liability, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 227, 230 (1973).
39. 67 Ill.2d at 353, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
40. Id. at 352, 367 N.E.2d at 1252.
41. Id. at 352-53, 367 N.E.2d at 1252-53. See generally Note, The Impact of Medical Know-
ledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 563 (1962).
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the defendants' argument, the Renslow court implicitly overruled
Amann. But, as properly suggested by one Illinois appellate court,
the opinion in Amann "should be considered in the light of its over-
all reasoning and tenor." 42 Amann was based upon the difficulty of
proving the causal relation between the prenatal injury and the sub-
sequent apparent damage. However, the Amann decision is no longer
in accord with modern medical science. 43  The Renslow court's deci-
sion to discard the necessity of establishing fetal viability represents a
significant extension of the early position of the common law and re-
flects the logical culmination of the growing erosion of the viability
criterion in Illinois.
Legal Duty and the Role of Foreseeability
As mentioned above, 44 the formula for negligence requires the
existence of a duty to the injured party. In simplest form, a legal duty
is a judicially recognized obligation to exercise ordinary care to avoid
injury to another.'5 The concept of foreseeability, in large part, de-
termines the risks and responsibilities that fall within the scope of a
legal duty of care. 46  Accordingly, what the reasonable person
foresees or should foresee defines the extent of his liability. The de-
fendants in Renslow alleged that the neurological injuries complained
of were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of their conduct. 47 The
Renslow court rejected this contention and emphasized that contem-
porary medicine specifically recognized that improper multiple trans-
fusions of blood posed significant risks. 48
42. Daley v. Meier, 33 I11. App.2d 218, 223, 178 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1st Dist. 1961). The
"tenor" of Amann reflects a concern with the difficulties of proof.
43. For a comprehensive discussion of the general medical considerations, see Note, The
Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
554, 565-80 (1962).
44. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
45. Kay v. Ludwick, 87 I1. App.2d 114, 230 N.E.2d 494 (Fourth Dist. 1967). See Schutt v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 79 Ill. App.2d 69, 223 N.E.2d 264 (Fifth Dist. 1967).
46. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 146 (4th ed. 1971).
47. Brief and Argument of Appellant at 16-19, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 ll.2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
48. 67 Ill.2d at 353-54, 367 N.E.2d at 1253. Justice Ryan in his dissent, however, spoke of
the potential injustice such a decision would work upon doctors subjected to a claim perhaps
half a century from the time of their wrongful conduct. He feared that under the majority's
theory of foreseeability, doctors could be held liable for unforeseeable consequences. Id. at 376,
367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Dooley, in his concurring opinion, responded
by charging that Justice Ryan misconceived the nature of foreseeability in determining "un-
foreseeability" through the measure of time. Id. at 369-70, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Dooley, J.,
concurring). Justice Dooley's contention appears to be the more accurate one because the con-
cept of foreseeability is concerned with the likelihood of injury to a particular interest and not
the period of time it takes for the injury to attach. See Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fash-
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The appellate court in Renslow extended a legal duty to the plain-
tiff wholly on the basis of foreseeability of harm. 49  Although the
Renslow majority rejected the appellate court's finding that foresee-
ability and duty are identical in scope, 5° Justice Dooley, in his concur-
ring opinion, disagreed, stating "foreseeability ...[is] the most
important test in determining duty." 51 In his view, since Emma
Renslow would someday become pregnant, the defendants were
under a duty to correctly type her blood so as to avoid the risk of
harm to the potential child that would result from a wrongful transfu-
sion to the mother. However, Justice Dooley refused to confront the
societal implications of imposing duty, treating such implications as
"foreign to the question presented here." 52
Justice Dooley's seemingly myopic loyalty to the traditional concept
of foreseeability conflicts with the common law's preoccupation with
broad considerations of social policy. 53 Perhaps, in partial support of
Justice Dooley's position, foreseeability can play a significant role in
those negligence actions involving familiar patterns of conduct. But
where the circumstances are novel, as in Renslow, the law must im-
pose a legal duty on the basis of its potential societal consequences
rather than the manipulation of the obscure boundaries of foresee-
ability. 54 In this regard, the majority in Renslow correctly pointed
ion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 lll.2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975); Lipsey v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 46 lll.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
49. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 I11. App.3d at 239, 351 N.E.2d at 874 (4th Dist. 1976).
50. Citing Cunis v. Brennen, 56 lll.2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974), an Illinois case which
held that no legal duty arises unless harm is reasonably foreseeable. The Renslow court,
nevertheless, contended that the existence of a legal duty is not to be based solely upon the
factor of fbreseeahility. 67 lll.2d at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
51. 1d. at 364, 367 N.E.2d at 1258 (Dooley, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 370, 367 N.E.2d at 1261. Dissenting in Renslow, justice Underwood pointed out
potential adverse implications if such an action were allowed: "the likelihood of suits filed de-
cades after the alleged negligence occurred, the difficulty of proving or defending against such
claims, the impossibility of acturarial measurement of the risks involved, successive recoveries
hy unborn abnormal generations affected by genetic changes. Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at
1262 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
53. See Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 III. 496, 36 N.E. 983 (1894) where the court defined
the common law:
[l]t is a system of elementary rules and of general declarations of principles, which
are continually expanding with the progress of society, adopting themselves to the
gradual changes of trade, commerce, arts, inventions, and the exigencies and usages
of the country.
Id. at 502, 36 N.E. at 984. But see Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272,
159 N.W. 916 (1916), which emphasized that the concept of negligence is concerned solely with
the individual involved in the litigation.
54. However valuable the concept of foreseeability is to remain in future negligence actions,
its vitality is minimal in cases of first impression. See Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L.
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out that there are areas of foreseeable harm in which no duty arises. 55
Thus, policy considerations, traditional rules of law, and common ex-
perience must also weigh heavily in the analysis of the duty issue.
To measure the social desirability of imposing a legal duty, three
factors should be considered: who may best prevent the hazard, the
economic magnitude of the risk, and who may best absorb the
loss. 56 In Renslow, the plaintiff persuasively argued for the imposi-
tion of a legal duty on the basis of these factors. 57  The court
explicitly recognized that the defendants were in the best position to
prevent the hazard since the medical field had effectively developed
techniques capable of mitigating a child's prenatal harm. Although not
articulated by the Renslow court, the magnitude of the risk of harm
to the plaintiff in the form of mental and physical deformities also
appears to compel the finding of a legal duty. In addition, the infer-
ence may be drawn from the Renslow court's resolution of the duty
issue in favor of the plaintiff that hospitals and doctors may serve as a
broader financial base upon which to absorb the loss than the limited
resources of the injured individual.58
Legal Existence and the Scope of a Legal Duty
The scope of a legal duty is also limited to a certain extent by
traditional rules of law which have been developed over many
years. 59 It is generally agreed that as a condition precedent to re-
REV. 789 (1930). Indeed, Cardozo's own decisions subsequent to Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (where Justice Cardozo first articulated the importance
of foreseeability in determining the scope of a legal duty) have indicated that other factors have
greater weight in defining a legal duty. See H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247
N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
55. The Renslow court pointed out three areas of foreseeable harm in which no duty has
arisen: (1) no duty to rescue a person foreseeably harmed; (2) no duty to a third person foresee-
ably injured while witnessing another harmed by a tortfeasor; and (3) in most cases, no duty to
one without a legally identifiable existence. 67 Ill.2d at 355, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
56. Lance v. Senior, 36 1ll.2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967). These factors have been recog-
nized by subsequent Illinois courts. See Mieher v. Brown, 54 1ll.2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973);
Barnes v. Washington, 56 Ill.2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535 (1973).
57. Brief and Argument of Appellees at 18-19, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
58. Prosser states that the real problem in determining the duty is "whether the defendants
in such cases should bear the heavy negligence losses of a complex civilization, rather than the
individual plaintiff." W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAV OF TORTS 257 (4th ed. 1971). The
defendants, hospitals and doctors can best bear the economic burden of loss since they are in a
position to distribute the loss to the general public.
59. 67 Ill.2d at 375, 367 N.E.2d at 1263 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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covery, a plaintiff must show that a legal duty was owed to him. 60
The Renslow defendants argued that there must be a person in being
to whom a duty of reasonable care may be owed. Since the plaintiff
had not been conceived at the time of the alleged negligent conduct,
the defendants asserted that they were not required to exercise a
duty of care toward the plaintiff.61
In rejecting the defendants' argument, the Renslow court accu-
rately perceived that Dietrich and its progeny indicate that a legal
duty could be owed only to one with a legally identifiable interest. 62
The common law proposition was that the unborn child's legal per-
sonality began at birth.63 However, the growing medical and scien-
tific recognition of the unborn child as a separate entity from the
mother compelled the courts to extend the common law concepts of
liability. Through the use of the legal fiction that an infant is "in esse"
prior to birth, 64 the courts have found the existence of duties owed to
infants closer and closer to the moment of conception. 65  Yet, as in
60. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1023 (1928).
See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
61. Brief and Argument of Appellant at 8-14, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il1.2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
62. 67 Ill.2d at 355, 367 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
63. Justice Holmes in Dietrich said that he knew of no case which held that an infant could
maintain an action for injuries received while in the mother's womb. This isolated statement
evolved into the proposition that the common law afforded no recovery for an infant injured
before its birth. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242
(1884). See also Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Lipps v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916); Walker v. Great N. R.R. Co., 28
L.R.Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
The viability requirement, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions after Bonbrest, 65 F.
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), was based upon the judicial determination that the fetus, capable of
quasi-independent life, is existent in fact for purposes of common law recovery. Although not
born, the viable fetus is capable of surviving severance from its mother. Those courts allowing
recovery for prenatal injuries sustained by a viable infant apparently have refused to deny the
action simply because the child is located "in utero" rather than in the external world. See note
15 and accompanying text supra.
64. A legal fiction is a device which attempts to conceal the fact that a judicial decision is
not in harmony with the existing law. Note, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful
or Detrimental to Its Growth?, 7 HARv. L. REV. 249, 262 (1893). For a comprehensive look at
legal fictions, see Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 865 (1930).
65. Early common law cases refused to recognize the legal fiction of the civil law that an
unborn child may be regarded as born for some legal purposes connected with the acquisition
and preservation of real and personal property. Later courts recognized viability as a criterion
sufficiently compatible with the requirement articulated by Lord Coke that the child must have
reached some degree of quasi-independent life at the moment of the tortious act. This, of
course, is a legal fiction, for a viable child is not existent in fact until birth. Thus, if the expecta-
tion of birth is the courts' underlying reason for implying existence to a viable fetus, the stage of
development of the fetus at the time of the wrongful act is immaterial. Yet, the court, recogniz-
ing actions for prenatal injuries sustained before viability, have attempted to couch their deci-
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Renslow, where the tortious conduct occurs prior to the plaintiff's
conception, the plaintiff at the time of the act was in no sense a
separate entity to which the traditional concept of duty might be
owed. Thus, the Renslow court was constrained to reexamine this
evolved condition of legal existence.
Strong authority exists in favor of limiting the scope of a legal duty
to injured plaintiffs who were in existence at the time of the tortious
conduct. 66 For example, Justice Ryan, in his dissent in Renslow,
remained unwilling to discard this rule of law which he believed had
developed over many years, and which he viewed as fundamental to
the traditional concept of duty. He asserted that the majority's deci-
sion abandoned the traditional fault concept of liability based upon
duty and foreseeability, adopting, instead, a theory of recovery based
upon the element of causation. 67 Under the causation theory of lia-
bility, a legal duty is purportedly owed not only to those reasonably
expected to be harmed from the misconduct but also to those who are
in fact injured. 68 The only burden upon the plaintiff would be to
establish the elements of breach of a legal duty and causation. 69
There is, at most, only partial support for Justice Ryan's argument
of causation. Of those jurisdictions that have allowed an action for
preconceptional tort liability, many have focused upon proving causa-
sions in terms of the physiologically independent "existence" of the embryo from the moment of
its conception. Even so, a fetus of this degree of maturity is certainly not in the existent form
contemplated by the early common law. See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga.
504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1st Dist. 1961);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d
93 (1960).
66. The problem of whether a non-existent person may be owed a duty of care has continu-
ally plagued the courts in the area of prenatal tort liability. Most decisions allowing recovery
have stressed the requirement of fetal viability. See Comment, Negligence and the Unborn
Child: A Time for Change, 18 S.D. L. REV. 204, 213 n.74 (1973) for a comprehensive listing of
these cases. Some courts have stressed the moment of conception. See note 16 supra. The only
purpose of these requirements could be to show that the plaintiff was in existence at the time of
the tortious conduct. See James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. L. REV. 778, 789
(1953).
67. 67 Ill.2d at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262.
68. If Justice Ryan were correct, the majority's position would parallel that of Justice An-
drews' dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 163 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting). In that decision, the majority held that a legal duty may be owed only to
foreseeable plaintiffs. Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 100. Justice Andrews, on the other hand, asserted
that a legal duty may be owed not only to those whom harm might reasonably be expected to
result but also to those who are in fact injured. Id. at 347, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting). See Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953) for a different perspec-
tive on Palsgraf.
69. Id. at 354, 162 N.E. at 105. But see Prosser, supra note 80 at 24 for a critical discussion
of the imposition of liability on the basis of causation.
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tion and avoided the traditional negligence analysis. 70  However, Jus-
tice Ryan is incorrect in his conclusion that the majority established
liability solely on the basis of causation. The majority specifically cited
two causation cases and explicitly rejected imposing liability wholly
on such a basis.71 The Renslow court emphasized that even if causa-
tion was used, policy lines would still have to be drawn to narrow the
area of actionable causation. 72 Thus, the majority properly reaf-
70. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956);
LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483,
147 A.2d 108 (1958); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Sylvia v.
Gobielle, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 343, 99
N.W.2d 163 (1959).
71. The Renslow majority opinion cited Jorgen;en v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483
F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) and Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc.2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976). In
Jorgensen, a woman purchased and used oral contraceptives for several months prior to the
conception of her two children. The plaintiff alleged that these contraceptives altered the
chromosomal structure within the body of the mother, creating a mongoloid deformity in the
viable fetuses and resulting in the death of one child and severe injuries to the other. The
Jorgensen court allowed the cause of action. In the Park case, the plaintiff-mother gave birth to
a child who died of polycystic kidneys, an hereditary disease. The parents alleged in their
complaint that the defendant-doctors had failed to take the necessary genetic tests to determine
whether the mother could transmit this disease to subsequent children. Acting entirely on the
defendant's advice, the parents conceived another child. This child also died of polycystic kid-
neys. The Park court allowed this wrongful death action based on a preconceptional tortious act.
Justice Dooley's concurring opinion, which can be viewed in part as a response to Justice
Ryan's dissent, asserted even more clearly than the majority that the court had not eliminated
the traditional elements of negligence in favor of the causation test. Differing with the majority's
interpretation of Jorgensen and Park, Justice Dooley viewed neither case as focusing upon cau-
sation and asserted instead that both decisions were based upon the traditional fault concept of
liability. He further contended that both cases, particularly Jorgensen, could stand as proper
authority for the plaintiff's action. 67 Ill.2d at 362-63, 367 N.E.2d at 1258 (Dooley, J., concur-
ring).
However, an examination of Jorgensen does not reveal support for Justice Dooley's position.
The tenth circuit court of appeals in Jorgensen explicitly chose to treat the action as one of
causation and not of duty and foreseeability. 483 F.2d at 240. Park, on the other hand, reflects
extensive preoccupation with the traditional elements of negligence and comports with Justice
Dooley's construction. See Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB.
L. REv. 706, 712-17 (1977) for a critical analysis of the Park decision. Thus, while the plaintiffs
strenuously argued for an imposition of liability on the basis of Jorgensen, this case as well as
the other causation-oriented cases can only provide partial support for the action. Brief and
Argument of Appellees at 13-16, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250
(1977). The fundamental consideration which underlies Jorgensen, and the other cases recogniz-
ing this type of action, is the legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body. See Park v.
Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 210 (1976); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d
218, 222 (1971); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J.
353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (holding that if wrongful conduct interferes with that right, damages
for such harm shall be recoverable by the child). See also Note, 63 HA~Ry. L. REv. 173 (1949). The
more fundamentally correct approach would be to apply the traditional elements of negligence, as
successfully accomplished in Park, 387 N.Y. S.2d at 210-11. The likelihood of harm to a forsee-
able class of persons is sufficient to establish tort liability.
72. 67 Ill.2d at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254. If a legal duty were to be extended to all those in
fact injured by an actor's wrongful conduct, as asserted by Justice Andrews in Palsgraf v. Long
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firmed the utility of legal duty, and its accompanying considerations
of foreseeability, social policy, traditional rules of law, and logic, 73 in
circumscribing liability.
Various courts and commentators also have asserted that it is un-
necessary to limit the scope of a legal duty to existent plaintiffs. 74
This seems to be the more accurate position. The requirement of
legal existence can be traced back to Justice Holmes' mandate in
Dietrich 75 that there be a live-born infant at the time of the tortious
conduct. Yet, Justice Holmes' statement was not derived from the
common law, since the common law provided no authority on either
side of the question. This "rule," then, reflects not a common law
prnciple but rather a realization of the practical difficulties that the
courts would encounter in extending a legal duty to a nonexistent
entity.76 Thus, the continual progress of the medical sciences since
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting), there would still
be a need to limit liability. As Dean Prosser wrote:
It is of no aid to say, with Andrews, that the question is one of "practical politics,"
or with Edgerton that it is merely one of "justice." All of the law is a combination of
both, and neither has been defined to the satisfaction of anyone. It is cold comfort
either to the lawyer seeking to decide how to decide whether to settle his case, or
the judge seeking to decide how to decide it, to be told that there is "little to guide
us other than common sense."
See Prosser, supra note 68, at 24.
73. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
74. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. See also James, Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 778, 788-89 (1953); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the
Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 566 n.77 (1962); Case and Com-
ment, Report of the Scottish Law Commission on Antenatal Injury, 1974 Jun. REV. 83.
75. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
76. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) is the leading
American case on the subject of the scope of a legal duty. Palsgraf required that, as a condition
precedent to recovery, the negligent conduct must harm a foreseeable interest. Id. at 347, 162
N.E. at 101. However, as one commentator asserted, "The limitation of the Palsgraf case con-
tains no requirement that the interests within the range of peril be known or identified in the
actor's mind, or even be in existence at the time of the negligence." James, Scope of Duty in
Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 788 (1953); See Kine v, Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C.
227, 230 (1924); 63 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1949); Seavy, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 209, 210
(1931). There are those who apparently must believe, however, that this requirement of exis-
tence is part of the traditional fault concept of liability. See note 66 supra; Renslow v. Mennon-
ite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d at 375, 367 N.E.2d at 1263 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Those who espouse the
former view have phrased their position in conclusory fashion.
In Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 II!. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), the court reviewed both
Dietrich and Walker v. Great Northern R.R. Co., 28 L.R.Ir. 69 (1891), and denied recovery on
the ground that no authority could be found to show that a legal duty had ever been held to
arise toward that which was not in existence in fact. Ironically, this same lack of authority
argument spawned an expanse of case law mandating the converse "principle" that a legal duty
must be owed to that which is existent in fact. However, this position is as groundless as the
former, since there is an equal absence of authority establishing its validity. Indeed, the only
conclusion to be derived from the common law is that there simply was no authority on either
side of the question. J. SALMOND, LAw OF TORTS, 346 (10th ed., Stallybraus, 1945z. Thus,
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Dietrich and the concomitant mitigation of the problems of proving
causation necessitate the abrogation of the requirement of existence. 77
Logic also compels the extension of the scope of legal duty. The
Renslow court found it illogical to bar relief for an act done prior to
subsequent courts that recognized recovery for prenatal injuries sustained by viable fetuses, and
in some cases by non-viable fetuses, in a sense missed the mark. Their strained efforts to
impute existence to a prenatally injured infant were largely directed toward Justice Holmes'
mandate requiring a live-born infant at the time of the act, a requirement the validity of which
is highly questionable. As the court stated in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d
550 (1951):
The only logical basis for denying recovery by a child for an injury while "en ventre
sa mere" (in its mother's womb) is that stated by Justice Holmes. He based it upon
a common law which had no positive existence, but is derived from an isolated
statement by Lord Coke, which is itself modified in the same sentence by the
suggestion that the law in many cases has consideration for the unborn child by
reason of the expectation of its birth.
Id. at 429, 79 A.2d at 560.
The failure to extend a legal duty to infants prenatally injured by preconceptional wrongful
conduct must rest upon the same fundamental and practical considerations dealt with in the
area of prenatal tort liability. Thus, if the common law provided no authority on the issue of
whether a duty is owed only to existent entities, the appropriate analysis must be directed
toward the other factors which serve to influence the determination of legal duties.
77. Five factors have been suggested to determine the existence of a legal duty. See Green,
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928), 29 COLUM. L. REV.
255 (1929) (reprinted in L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930)). These five factors are helpful in
critically analyzing the early common law position denying recovery for prenatal injuries. Trans-
lated into Green's "factors," the early common law position can be viewed in the following
manner: (1) the ethical or moral factor-there is no life to be guarded apart from the mother's
at the time of the actor's conduct; (2) the economic factor-the fictitious claims and false tes-
timony would bear heavily upon the resources of the defendant; (3) the prophylactic factor-the
defendant's desire to exercise care and solicitude would be for the mother and not the child
born apart from her; (4) the justice factor-man's obligations are determined from his view-
point, and he generally reckons life from the time of the child's birth; and (5) the administration
factor-the claims would be incapable of proof. For a further discussion of these factors, see
Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordon, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
These fundamental difficulties have been effectively attacked by contemporary authorities. See
Comment, Negligence and the Unborn Child: A Time for Change, 18 S.D. L. REv. 204 (1973);
James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 778 (1953); 63 HARV. L. REV.
173 n.50 (1949). The remaining obstacle in these actions is the inherent difficulty of proof. As
Justice O'Brien stated in Walker v. Great Northern R.R. Co., 28 L.R.Ir. 69 (1891), "There are
instances in the law where rules of right are founded upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty
or impossibility of proof." Id. In Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) the
court incisively argued that in the days of Coke, Blackstone, and Holmes, difficulty of proof
presented insurmountable issues left to be resolved with very little known about the physiologi-
cal status of the fetus. Thus, the progressive enlightenment of the medical sciences compels the
erosion of the argument denying recovery.
There is, therefore, a growing deterioration of the need to consider the legal status of the
unborn child at the time of the wrongful conduct. See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1973); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 I11.
App.3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (4th Dist. 1976); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 361, 157 A.2d
497, 503 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 271, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960). See also Note,
Legal Protection to Unborn Children, 15 HARV. L. REv. 313 (1902).
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conception when the defendant's knowledge of fetal existence is ir-
relevant for purposes of contemporary prenatal tort liability. 78  The
wrongful character of the act would be the same whether occurring
prior to or subsequent to conception. 79  Indeed, the exact moment of
conception is medically indeterminable 80 and, in this sense, totally
inadequate for purposes of establishing the point in time when liabil-
ity attaches.
Renslow comports with the traditional concept of common law neg-
ligence because it was reasonably foreseeable by both the defendants'
doctor and hospital that thirteen year old Emma Renslow would
"grow up, marry and become pregnant." 81 Thus, the plaintiff was
within the range of peril foreseeable by the defendants at the time of
the wrongful transfusion of blood, and for this reason as well as for
the pressing considerations of social policy and logic, she was entitled
to the protection afforded by a legal duty of care.
THE IMPACT OF THE RENSLOW DECISION
The subject of preconceptional tort liability has most often been
raised in connection with the possibility of recovery for an infant's
78. 67 1ll.2d at 357. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.3, at 1030
(1956) where the authors state:
A Texas court has said that a reasonable man "reckons life from the time of birth.
His conscious care and solicitude are for the expectant mother and not for the
unborn child apart from her!" If this amazing statement means that present trauma-
tic injury to a pregnant woman cannot reasonably be seen to endanger the foetus or
the after-born child, it flies in the face of medical knowledge which is widely shared
(in its rough outlines) by laymen. If it is meant in any narrower sense, it misses the
point. If I negligently run into a bakery truck, my "conscious care and solicitude"
may be only for the solitary driver, the truck, and the pies. Yet if the back of the
truck is filled with children, I am liable to them too if they are hurt. And the
improper canning of baby food today is negligence to a child born next week or next
year, who consumes it to his injury.
79. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 11. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1963) where the
court emphasized the irrefutable logic of allowing this action:
So let us go still further and take a third suppositive case, where the wrongful act
also takes place before conception but the injury attaches at the moment of concep-
tion .... If a child is born malformed or an imbecile because of the genetic effect
on his father and mother of a negligently or intentionally caused atomic explosion,
will he be denied recovery because he was not in being at the time of the explo-
sion?
Id. at 250-51, 190 N.E.2d at 854.
80. See J. DELEE & J. GREENHILL, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 96 (8th ed.
1943); 4B R. GoRDY-GRAY, ATTOR'NEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, § 311.30 (3d ed. 1977).
Proof of conception also has concerned some judges. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 507, 93 S.E.2d 727, 730 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
81. 67 Ill.2d at 365, 367 N.E.2d at 1258.
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prenatal injuries caused by radiation and chemical accidents. 82  The
dissenting opinion in Renslow raised fears of the likelihood of suits
filed decades after the alleged negligence by successive generations of
abnormal infants affected by genetic changes. 83 Indeed the possibil-
ity of perpetual liability looms large as an argument against recogni-
tion of this action. Ultimately, the general public would be forced to
bear the economic burden of these negligence actions. Manufacturers
compelled to pay massive negligence losses would mitigate the
economic impact by increasing the prices of their products. Insurance
companies required to satisfy claims for prenatal injuries would dis-
tribute the cost of these payments to the general public in the form of
increased premium rates. In response to these considerations, the
Renslow majority qualified the right to recovery with two significant
limitations. First, the damage cannot by its nature be self-
perpetuating, and second, the plaintiff cannot be a remote descen-
dant.8 4  Thus, the scope of preconceptional tort liability in Illinois
should be confined sufficiently to the factual situation presented in
Renslow, reducing in large part the potential injurious ramifications of
this decision.
Preconceptional tort liability also has been discussed in relation to
recoveries for "wrongful life." 85 A wrongful life action seeks damages
for the birth itself rather than for a distinct prenatal injury. The
Renslow decision is not a persuasive authority for this type of action
because of the overriding legal, social and judicial considerations
which effectively preclude the recognition of such a right. 86 Bearing
82. See S. Estep & E. Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries from Radiation, 24
LA. L. REV. 1 (1963); Comment, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Prob-
lems in Tort Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 414 (1974).
83. 67 11.2d at 371-81, 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
85. See generally Park v. Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976); Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for
'Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966); Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status
of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 I11. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1963). In
this case, the plaintiff was the infant son of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant fraudulently induced the mother to have sexual intercourse with him through false prom-
ises of marriage. As a result of the sexual contact, the plaintiff was conceived and thereafter
born. He sought damages for the deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a
normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit firom his father, and for being stigmatized as a
bastard. While the court recognized that the elements of a preconceptional tort were present, it
refused to create an action for wrongful life:
It is not the suits of illegitimates which give us concern, great in numbers as these
may be. What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related suits
which would be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into
the world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages
for being born of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a
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in mind that an action for damages is implicit in any remedy for a
tortious wrong, most courts would continue to deny an action for
wrongful life on the basis that recovery of damages, which are
speculative at best, would have staggering societal implications.
The future significance of the Renslow decision may lie in its effect
on Illinois wrongful death actions. Essentially the Wrongful Death
Statute of Illinois allows recovery for those actions maintainable by
the infant had it survived. 8 7  In the area of prenatal tort liability, one
Illinois Supreme Court decision permitted survivors of a stillborn
fetus to sue for its wrongful death where the injuries were sustained
while the fetus was in a viable state. 88 Since the Renslow court re-
jected viability as a criterion for recovery, the decision should consti-
tute strong precedent for abrogating the necessity of establishing via-
bility as a condition precedent to recovery.8 9 However, this is not to
suggest that viability can serve no purpose. The Illinois Wrongful
Death Statute clearly requires the death of a "person" in order to
recover damages. 90  The viable fetus can be characterized properly as
a "person" since it is capable of survival in the external world outside
hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for
being born into a large and destitute family, another because a parent has an unsa-
vory reputation.
Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1975). This statute states in part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in re-
spect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corpora-
tion which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an
action for damages ...
The relevant portion of the statute allows recovery for those actions maintainable by the
infant had he survived birth. Clearly, those actions would be grounded upon common law tort
principles. Thus, the arguments pertaining to prenatal injuries apply with equal weight to
wrongful death recovery. See Discussion of Recent Decisions, Damages for the Wrongful Death
of a Fetus-Proof of Fetal Viability, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 227 (1974).
88. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 1ll.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973). In Chrisafogeor-
gis, the decedent's mother, while in her 36th week of pregnancy, was struck by the defendant's
automobile as she walked across a street in September of 1966. Emergency surgery failed to
save the infant who allegedly died as a result of the accident. The court, relying on Amann v.
Faidy, 415 I11. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953) held that there could be a recovery under the
Wrongful Death Act for the wrongful death of a viable fetus born dead as a result of prenatal
injuries. See note 38 supra.
89. See Discussion of Recent Decisions, Damages for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus-
Proof of Fetal Viability, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 227, 228 n. 17 (1974) for a comprehensive listing
of those jurisdictions permitting an action for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus, prenatally
injured while viable. However, the viability limitation is as objectionable in wrongful death
actions as in prenatal tort liability actions. See Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions
for Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 61, 78 (1960).
90. See note 87 supra.
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of the mother's womb. Thus, viability can be used as a meaningful
determinant to signify the point in time after which fetal death may
occur for purposes of wrongful death recovery. 91
CONCLUSION
The Renslow court in a well-reasoned opinion recognized a right of
action for preconceptional tort recovery and again demonstrated that
the genius of the common law lies in its flexibility and capacity for
adaptation. 92  To suggest that this decision abandons traditional con-
cepts of tort liability is to ignore the fundamental principle that the
common law, by way of damages, gives redress for personal injuries
inflicted by the wrongful negligence of another. 93  The Renslow deci-
sion has shown that the inherent problems of proof and the implicit
inability of the courts to conceptualize the legal existence of a poten-
tial life should not serve to deny a right of action where justice and
social policy demand it. 9 4  The overriding judicial concern in Renslow
for the rights of the prenatally injured child has created for the time
being, the desirable consequence of forcing doctors and hospitals to
exercise additional care and caution in the administration of blood
transfusions. Indeed, as the plaintiff successfully argued in Renslow,
"[t]o require doctors and hospitals to guard against the transfusion of
patients with mistyped blood is a burden of profoundly reasonable
proportions." 95
Scott Bleser Greene
91. Such a construction may be in conflict with the statutory intent. See Recent Decisions,
Damages for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus, note 89 supra at 232-33. However, there is strong
medical authority in favor of adopting such a construction of viability. See A. MILUNSKY, GENE-
TICS AND THE LAw 39 (1976). Practical difficulties of determining fetal death should not bar the
use of viability as the stage after which the death of a "person" may occur. See D. DANFORTH,
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 264 (1966).
By construing the word "person" in the Wrongful Death Act to include the viable fetus, the
court in Chrisafogeorgis may have implicitly suggesled that the infant need not actually be born
alive before death, but simply have attained the degree of maturity at death where it could have
survived in the external world if death had not ensued.
92. 67 Ill.2d at 362, 367 N.E.2d at 1254. See Amann v. Faidy, 415 I11. 422, 432-34, 114
N.E.2d 412, 418 (1953).
93. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 I11. 359, 369-70, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (1900) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting).
94. The decision also rejected countervailing considerations of cost. It has been suggested
that the public has reached the point where it can no longer bear the economic burden of our
present-day system of tort law. 67 Ill.2d at 373, 367 N.E.2d at 1263 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance, and its inflammatory effect upon the
cost of individual health care, perhaps compels the rejection of such a tort action.
95. Brief and Argument of Appellees at 19, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il.2d 348, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
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